Six Reasons Why Putin Seems To Have Lost In Eastern Ukraine
By
Paul Gregory (Hoover
Institution and University of Houston)
There is a growing consensus that Vladimir Putin has abandoned his
campaign to take control of east Ukraine. The fog of war, such as the killing
of nearly 20 Ukrainian soldiers yesterday, is obscuring the distinct turn in
the tide. Putin’s goal has changed from dismantling Ukraine as a united state
to destabilizing Sunday’s presidential election in the east. Ukraine has a
chance for a third lease on life. It cannot afford to blow this chance by
returning to its old ways of governing. Ukraine’s third lease on life will
likely be its last if wasted.
repost from Paul Gregory's blog.
The noted Russian civil rights activist and political analyst, Lilia
Shevtsova, wrote on her Facebook
page that Vladimir Putin has “buried the New Russia project in a copper
urn.” Businessweek headlines
that Ukraine’s government has gained the advantage over the separatists. The New
York Times cites the metalworkers’ retaking of Mariupol from the
separatists as the
turning point in the battle. An unauthenticated
document that is burning up the internet shows the military commander of
separatist forces ordering up a plan for escape to the Russian border. To add
icing to the cake, Ukraine’s richest
man has just announced peace marches and demonstrations of honking automobiles
throughout the Donbass against the so-called People’s Republic of Donetsk,
whose leaders, he sarcastically notes, no one in the region knows or has heard
of.
Quite a change from two weeks back.
On May 11, the self-appointed leaders of the self-proclaimed People’s
Republic of Donetsk (PRD) were celebrating their referendum triumph.
After all, 96.7 percent purportedly voted for independence in the Donbass’s
second largest city (Mariupol), and large majorities were reported for Donetsk
and Luhansk. They busied themselves with petitions to formally join the Russian
Federation. Full speed ahead.
Fast forward a week and tell-tale signs started to indicate that the
referendum was not a victory but a signal collapse. The sports analogy –
momentum means everything – seems to apply here, and momentum shifted sharply
and suddenly against the separatists.
Why has Putin buried – to use Shevtsova’s words – his campaign for east
Ukraine in a copper urn?
First, the May 11 referendum put the nail in the coffin of Russia’s hopes
to win the hearts and minds of the Russian speakers of east Ukraine. Without
them on his side, Putin could not take the territory he wanted without regular
troops.
Even the Russian media reported the referendum results with uncharacteristic
restraint. According to the RIA Novosti account,
the referendum contributes to “a dialog between Kiev and Luhansk and Donetsk as
the most rational way to deescalate the situation and promote a legitimate
presidential election.” (Earlier Putin railed against the presidential
election. Why the change of heart?) The official Russian reaction to the PRD
referendums was a far cry from the breathtaking annexation of Crimea after its
referendum. Russia appeared not interested in a phony referendum to take
Donbass.
Contrary to the muted Russian response, the Western media united in its
dismissal of the referendum and its reported official results. The Economist,
not noted for hyperbole, described the Donbass election as Ukraine’s
bogus referendums.
Quite a different reaction from the Crimean referendum. Although the Western
press and diplomatic corps condemned the violation of international law, they
expressed reluctant “understanding” of Russia’s actions and conceded that the
referendum represented the will of the people. (Wrong. For the actual Crimean
results, see my
Forbes article of May 5.) The Crimean annexation is not something Ukraine should
let go without a fight.
The 24/7 drumbeat of pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian propaganda did not shape
east Ukrainian public opinion as hoped for, other than to frighten ordinary
citizens. Various polls
agree that, although 20-30 percent of east Ukraine is disaffected, its citizens
still prefer a united Ukraine, rather than annexation into the Russian
Federation. Putin hoped for another result, but he did not get his wishes.
Second, although the Ukrainian ATO (Anti-terrorist operation) has
been erratic and at times bumbling, it is bound to improve over time. It has
already succeeded in surrounding and neutralizing the Russian command and control
centers of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, manned by the same professionals from
Russia and Ukraine who, by their own assertion (See Paul Goble’s Windows
On Eurasia analysis), were part of the team that carried out the Anschlusss
of Crimea. The ATO pits an army, albeit weak and undisciplined, against a few
seasoned Little Green Men supported by largely drunken “volunteers.”
Note that Putin has ignored increasingly desperate pleas from the separatist
leadership for assistance, such as the May 12 “first
decree” of Colonel Igor Strelkov (aka Strelok, real name Girkin), who
appeals to the Kremlin as follows:
“Given the urgency of the situation in the country, the genocide of the
Donetsk population unleashed by the junta in Kyiv and the threats of
intervention by NATO, I appeal to the Russian Federation to provide military
assistance to the Dnepropetrovsk (sic Donetsk) People’s Republic.”
Five days later (May 17) a frustrated Strelkov appealed directly to the
people of east Ukraine for assistance. Reading in a monotone before the cameras
(See Strelkov
YouTube), Strelkov castigated the cowardice of the men of the Donbass, who
either sit fearfully at home, or use the weapons given them to “loot and maraud.”
If the men are such cowards, let brave women step forward, challenged Strelkov.
Such an ungrateful people after all we “volunteers from Russia and Ukraine”
have done for you.
Putin’s unwillingness to reinforce the command and control center for all of
east Ukraine means that separatist forces cannot turn back Ukraine’s
assault. Putin cannot take significant swaths of east and south Ukraine
without a stable base of operations run by professionals. He has abandoned
them, and they see the writing on the wall. A hostage,
released after three weeks of captivity, confirmed the low level of moral among
the Little Green Men.
Third, while the separatist forces have concentrated their hard core assets
in the smaller cities of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, they have relied on agent
provocateurs, protest tourists, paid demonstrators, and unknown self-appointed
mayors and governors to destabilize the large cities. The degree of force and
repression in Donetsk, Odessa, Luhansk, and Mariupol has been markedly less than
in the smaller occupied cities.
Although Russian diversionists and their allies are able to disrupt the big
cities and organize demonstrations that lead to violence and even loss of life,
the big cities remain, albeit tenuously, in the hands of the Ukrainian
government, which continues to carry out basic administrative functions.
No one appears to know what goes on in occupied municipal buildings other than
the planning of more unrest.
The “Little Green Men” behind the kidnappings, executions, torture, and
human shields that characterize their operations in or around Slavyansk are a
most unsavory lot. According to the Winnipeg Ukrainian Center’s study of Russian
mercenaries in the Donbas, a number belong to the feared “Terek Wolves” of
Russia’s Kuban region, have criminal records, had served with Russian
intelligence services, and hold Slavic neo-Nazi beliefs and use Nazi symbols –
strange backgrounds for these volunteers who purportedly came to save Ukraine
from neo-Nazis.
Russia’s Little Green Men are the opposite of good will ambassadors for
Mother Russia. (For a description of life inside Slavyansk, see Letter).
Word gets around. Who in their right mind would want to spend the rest of their
life in a country that allowed such monsters in positions of authority?
Fourth, the economic and political costs of the Donbass are
high enough to give pause to any plans for annexation. (See my Putin’s
promises could bankrupt Russia). The Donbass metallurgical complex requires
large subsidies from Kiev as it stands, and these subsidies would grow if
incorporated into Russia’s higher wages and pensions. The Russian Kuzbass
complex has spare capacity and operates at much higher levels of efficiency.
Also unnoted is that the energy-intensive Donbass consumes some 30 percent
of Ukraine’s natural gas deliveries. Once the Donbass is part of Russia,
Ukraine would have a real chance to reduce its dependency on Russian energy and
the Donbass would qualify for the lower domestic gas prices.
On the political calculus side, the annexation of the Donbass would remove from
the Ukrainian parliament its most pro-Russian legislators, leaving behind a
solid anti-Russian super majority that would not hesitate to petition for EU
and NATO membership – Putin’s greatest fear. The Kiev government would no
longer worry about the sensitivities of pro-Russian regions, which had shown
their distaste for Ukraine by leaving.
Fifth, the various businesses of Ukraine’s oligarchs cannot survive
in the chaos and uncertainty of separatism. As long as the campaign proceeds,
they would not know the financial and legal system in which they operated. They
would understand that Putin and his inner circle stand ready to devour their
assets, much as Yanukovich’s family did during his tenure. The risk of Russian
dominance was just too great for Ukraine’s richest men and women. At some
point, they had to step in to stop the nonsense.
The New York Times was among the first to emphasize the role
of the oligarchs in the battle for east Ukraine. The leading oligarch of
the east (Rinat Akhmetov) sat on the sidelines as long as possible, but he
moved decisively when the separatists demanded that he pay taxes to them rather
than Kiev. He mobilized his metal workers and their heavy equipment to clear
separatists from the embattled city of Mariupol within 24 hours. (For
Akhmetov’s statement in English and video with subtitles, go to his news release).
Note that Akhmetov saw the light only after the rebels came to him demanding
money. The oligarch-governor of neighboring Dnepropetrovsk understood the separatist
danger from the start and crushed the separatist movement before it could
start.
The Ukrainian oligarchs hold great sway over Ukrainian politics and the
economy. They retain enough clout – if united – to stave off separatist attacks
on their holdings. Akhmetov’s call for massive
anti-separatist demonstrations is the coup de grace for Putin’s separatist
campaign, and he knows it better than others. The turnout of protesters against
the separatists became an immediate object of controversy, with Russian sources
claiming low attendance and Radio Liberty
claiming tens of thousands.
Sixth, although Putin and his associates belittle sanctions, they are
clearly something to be avoided with the Russian economy headed for recession.
Putin has played a cat and mouse game, retreating just before the threat of
sanctions gets really serious. Putin held off sanctions by promising
cooperation and by maintaining the fig leaf that he had no control over the
separatists. However, he clearly understands that the incorporation of more
Ukrainian territory into Russia would trigger real sanctions as would the
disruption of the May 25 presidential election. Putin understands when it is
time to retreat.
With a stalemate of force, Putin realizes he can take valuable swaths of
Ukraine only by introducing regular troops. Regular troops would likely be met
with resistance, albeit disproportional, and the loss of Ukrainian lives would
risk a dramatic turn of public opinion against him. Part of the reason for
Putin’s adventurism was to get a boost from the pumped up patriotism of the
Ukraine campaign. Ukraine blood on Russia’s hands could have cancelled all that
in a minute.
Putin’s putting east Ukraine in a copper urn does not mean that he will give
up his destabilization campaign. It remains important for him to be able to
shrug off the presidential election results in the east of Ukraine as illegitimate.
The most recent diversionary activity of Russian backed separatists is to
threaten poll workers and to intimidate voters in the large and small cities of
the Donbass. We would expect such activity to increase over the next few days
as the election approaches. Putin will again claim he has no control over
separatists and supports the presidential election, while doing his best to
sabotage it in the south and east. Count on a massive increase in violence. The
fog of war will be intense and will belie the fact that the end is in sight.
Russia will continue to destabilize, but the new government can get its act
together and bring the separatist forces under control. There is no guarantee
that Putin will not want to revisit the New Russia campaign at a later date.
Burning up the internet is the purported
order of Colonel Strelkov, dated May 12. At the very end, he orders a plan
for the escape of his special forces to the Russian border, there to be aided
by Russian intelligence forces. Either authentic or a brilliant
counter-diversionary forgery of Ukrainian intelligence, Strelkov’s order
captures the moment better than any other image.
Colonel Strelkov’s Moscow apartment awaits him, unless Ukrainian security
forces capture him first and put him on trial for murder. Putin is also enough
of a student of Stalin to understand that he will need scapegoats. He will
claim it was these out-of-control idiots who made such a mess of things. I do
not know if Strelkov has more to fear from Putin, or from the Ukrainians.
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