Why Ukraine’s Army Received A Cold Welcome in the Liberated Towns of the East

By Anna O. Pechenkina (Carnegie Mellon University, USA)

 

Perusing my facebook feed’s many discussions about the war in the Donbas, I was struck by a comment that the soldiers of Ukrainian army were treated “worse than stray dogs” in the liberated towns and villages of eastern Ukraine. Another poignant comment remarked: why should my brother risk his life to liberate the   from separatists while the locals in eastern regions are not even grateful for his sacrifice? Despite numerous anecdotes of elated civilians greeting the Ukrainian army, it would be a mistake to conclude that Severodonetsk residents’ chanting of “Thank you” and “Glory to Ukraine” is the norm for the territories recaptured from the separatist militias in eastern Ukraine. This raises an important question: why did local population so often greet the Ukrainian service members coldly in liberated towns? The answer is indiscriminate violence employed against civilians.

Turn the Ukrainian army into a Swiss one?

By Roman Khimich (Ukraine)

 

Mid-August was marked by a series of statements by Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense. These statement signal a fundamental change in the system of manning the armed forces and, in a broader perspective, vision of the entire defense doctrine.

 

The system of basic military training is declared to be mandatory and should cover all reservists, that is, effectively a major part of the adult population, including both men and women. Citizens who have passed such training should form a people's militia, which, in turn, should serve as the basis for a national territorial defense system. Finally, the authorities voiced the aim to create guerrilla, sabotage and intelligence networks on the basis of volunteer corps in cases of external aggression.

All these steps, taken cumulatively, comprise the elements of a comprehensive reform, a model set by the organization of the Swiss Armed Forces.

 

This is not the first attempt undertaken by Ukrainian authorities to solve the problem of mobilizing population in the event of hostilities. In mid-March 2014, in the midst of a military confrontation on the Crimean peninsula, several working groups were created at the request of Andrii Parubiy, the former secretary of the NSDC (National Security and Defense Council). The experts were required to prepare a regulatory framework and trigger the establishment of the mass mobilization system. Specific forms of this system were to be clarified in the working process.

 

The author participated in one of these groups, which developed the project of Ukrainian Army Reserve. The working group proposed a framework governing territorial defense forces in different states and developed a holistic view on the matter. Based on this experience and knowledge, author offers his assessment of the ideas expressed by Ministry of Defense leadership.

How many troops does Russia need to occupy Ukraine?

Prof. Motyl argues that

• In order to occupy Donetsk and Luhansk provinces alone, Russian would have to deploy somewhere between 26,702 and 133,514 troops.

• A “land bridge” from Crimea to Transnistria would mean occupying Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odessa provinces—which would entail somewhere between 46,497 and 92,994 soldiers.

• Occupying all seven southeastern provinces would require between 118,536 (26,702 for Donetsk and Luhansk and 91,834 for the others) and 317,182 (133,514 for Donetsk and Luhansk and 183,668 for the others).

• If Russia decides to conquer all of Ukraine, it would need an additional 548,587 troops—for a grand total of 667,123 to 865,769 troops.

• Kyiv city and Kyiv Province alone would require 90,676 occupying soldiers.
• All of Ukraine = more than 500,000 soldiers

These calculations suggest that Russian troops concentrated next to the Ukrainian border may be not enough to occupy many oblasts in Ukraine. However, the current Russian forces could be enough to occupy one or two oblasts.