Is Putin's New Type Of War In Ukraine Failing?

By Paul Gregory (Hoover Institution and University of Houston)

As the Kiev EuroMaidan demonstrations were gathering momentum in late February, Anne Applebaum prophetically wrote: "Putin doesn't need to invade Ukraine. He can destabilize it from the Kremlin." So far, Applebaum's insight has proven correct. What we have seen is a covert war of destabilization, rather than an invasion by conventional means. While we focus on the 40,000 troops amassed on the border, Putin has, all the while, been conducting a war of another kind in ten strategic cities and towns in eastern Ukraine.

Instant Parsing: Does The Geneva Agreement Defuse The Ukrainian Crisis?

By Paul Gregory (Hoover Institution and University of Houston)

Today’s events constitute a surprise for me. I had expected a recalcitrant Russian negotiating stance that would deteriorate into a pointing of fingers of blame. The result, by all appearances was surprisingly positive, although the agreement was reached by ignoring or not spelling out the major points of contention.

Putin Needs Victory

Anders Aslund (PIIE) argues that the West should stop the Russian aggression now. This is the time to act because:

1. Putin has nearly complete (if not all) control over political/military decision making in Russia. He faces no internal opposition and so one should not expect that anybody in Russia can stop him.
2. Putin wants to restore the Soviet Union in some form. Crimea was an "appetizer" and Putin will continue aggression and, in fact, it is happening now in the East of Ukraine. 
3. Sanctions imposed on Russia are laughable. West has probably less credibility with Putin than President Kennedy had with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev after their disastrous summit in Vienna in 1961. That debacle led to the Cuban missile crisis. After Russia’s war in Georgia in August 2008, the West made some noise, but soon it turned quiet, ignoring the Russian aggression. Clearly, Putin expects that to happen once again.

Aslund suggests that Russia, however, is in no position to rival the West and the Russian economy is  highly vulnerable. The popularity of Putin in built on the notion that he's a successful manager and there should be a limit to how much economic damage Putin can tolerate. The West needs to test this hypothesis by imposing a truly great cost upon him with a broad array of sanctions.  Sanctions should be as deep as the ones imposed on Iran. At the same time, the West should obviously also supply arms to Ukraine as fast as possible.

 

Aslund concludes that the West needs to recognize that it cannot afford not to stop Putin. The earlier and more effectively that is accomplished, the lower the cost will be. The obvious parallel is the West’s failure to stop Nazi Germany in time in 1938.

Putin's Attack On Ukraine Began Today: What This Means For Europe And The US

By Paul Gregory (Hoover Institution and University of Houston)

Vladimir Putin had to act before the Ukrainian presidential election of May 25, at which time his narrative of neo-Nazis and nationalist extremists in charge of Ukraine would vanish into thin air.  Even Putin’s genius spin meisters could not portray a President Poroshenko from ex-boxer Klitschko’s UDAR party as a wild eyed extremist, nor could they whitewash the trivial vote for rightist candidates, although they would try.

Putin’s anti-Ukraine propaganda juggernaut rests squarely on the single fiction of a neo-Nazi, Jew-hating, extreme nationalist government in Kiev. If Putin waits out the election, his anti-Ukraine disinformation campaign directed to his Russian, southeastern Ukrainian, and Western audiences loses its credibility, even in receptive leftist quarters in the West.

True to expectations, Putin began today a coordinated attack on Eastern Ukraine and parts of Moldavia.