Planning for the post-Putin era
By Stefan Siewert
(Germany), Ph.D.
How the Ukrainian crisis might
look like in five years? We look at performance and identify most-probable growth
trajectories for the EU, Russia and the Ukraine, analyze drivers, the internal
logic of change and the influence of global trends when good or bad political
decision-making by the involved parties disappears.
Problem description
The
current situation around Ukraine is a mess. The seizure of Crimea was the first
time since World War II that a nation in Europe had engaged in territorial
conquest. Ukraine’s democratic and market orientation is challenged by loss of
territory and struggles to gain control over separatist area. Russia counteracts
a perceived threat of Western influence, democracy, rule of law, and NATO
enlargement. The possibility emerged of a permanent zone of conflict in eastern
Ukraine (King). The West, acting
in the best attention in offering support, is involved in a geopolitical
struggle. It imposed limited sanctions on Russia with the fear that the new cold
war could warm up considerably.
Despite
the context of growing global confrontation between main global powers during
the last years, the situation took all parties by surprise. The entire existing
fabric of international relations is under scrutiny (Posner), not last because of the impact on confidence and
valuations, and just general uncertainty. Differences in worldviews and
economic trends have transformed into an open conflict, where the West and
Russia are testing each other. The default lines serve the whole political
spectrum: the values of an open society and traditional values in the interpretation
of a petrol state; between demonization of Russia as a policy or an alibi for
an absence of it (Kissinger); between Western universalism and national
identity; between post-Cold War triumphalism and the lack of resources or
mandate to police the World; between the Western support for democratic change
in Ukraine and the lack of an EU membership perspective, to name a few.
It
is an asymmetric situation. On the one hand, GDP of the US and EU is
respectively 9 and 10 times bigger than of Russia. Russia’s total foreign debt
is almost twice its international currency reserve, creating crucial vulnerabilities.
Russia’s dependency on the export pipelines, demographic decline, widespread
corruption, incompetent administrations, regional disparities, as well as coming
obsolesce of its nuclear material dwarf the challenges faced by the US and
Europe. There is no real military threat to NATO members. During a meeting of
the International Monetary Fund in Washington the question was asked: “Do we
really want to destroy Russia that fast.” (Aslund 2014).
On the other hand, one
should be aware
of the perils of Russia’s retaliation. The West needs Russia’s cooperation for
strategic and geopolitical problem solving in Iran, Syria and Afghanistan, to
ensure EU’s uninterrupted gas supply (Granville),
from fighting terrorism to arms control to climate change. Russia has many
levers to influence the future of Ukraine and is capable of exploiting
Ukraine’s challenges and political fragmentation by different means and ways. Additionally,
if Ukraine’s West integration is a policy goal, cooperation with Russia lowers
the restructuring cost or might even not possible without it.
How
to makes sense of the current situation? What are the long-term consequences
that Ukraine became the de facto linchpin of Europe’s geopolitical equilibrium?
In order to gain a more differentiated understanding, one might wish to look
five years ahead where the influence of current good and bad political
decision-making disappears while economic and political megatrends prevail.
EU
The
worst may be over, but the EU is still in the midst of an outstanding historic
experiment about a new balance of national states and supranational
institutions. As often in major innovative undertakings, preliminary results
are disappointing. The EU GDP is below its 2007 figure. Unemployment remains at
a staggering 11.6 %. In Germany, the EU’s economic powerhouse, real wages are
mostly stagnating during the last 15 years. Deflation in the Southern periphery
worsens the structural adaptation process, the ongoing large-scale austerity
challenges democracy and political stability. The Euro-zone member Greece has
lost 25 per cent of its GDP without the perspective of recovering it in the
near future, which is unprecedented for a developed Western country. The EU
lacks shale gas and oil discoveries, which helped the US economy to achieve
“escape velocity” from the Great recession. Comparisons are always risky, but the
shadow of the global financial crisis from 2008 as well as the finding of the
new institutional equilibrium shares patterns with the transformation process
of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries after the fall of the
Berlin wall from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy that consumed growth
for 10 years or more.
The
ongoing internal restructuring process influences the possibilities to project
power to EU’s neighbourhood. EU is
divided on long-term issues by competing readings of current events and trends.
Lacking political will and economic resources, bureaucratic dilatoriness and
subordination of the strategic element to domestic politics does not help to
speak consistently with one voice. The EU enlargement process in the Balkans
came to a still stand in 2013 and is under threat. The EU Mediterranean trade
and cooperation agreements show disappointing results. To the East, the EU did
not offer EU membership, a proven, but demanding instrument for enlarging the
Western sphere of influence. The EU – Ukraine Association Agreement, signed on
27 June 2014, is a low-cost, low-impact replacement.
However,
when all other options have been tried out, the learning curve of nations and
elites will encounter a turning point for a sustainable political compromise that
might include, for example, the use of Eurobonds as one of the many minefields
in the current political negotiation process. If history is a guide, it is most
probably that the EU will re-enter a growth trajectory in the next five years. The
new equilibrium might not reflect the optimism of the Lisbon Agenda from the
year 2000 to become the most competitive region through a knowledge-based
economy. But it might be sufficient for a stronger commitment to common
defence, energy policy and contingency planning. More resources and political attention
will be available for large-scale initiatives in order to shape EU’s periphery.
Russia
Russia
had the best era in its history full of drama and turmoil, a Golden age of
prosperity and stability. Growth rates from 1998 – 2008 were 7 per cent. Measured
in constant (2009) roubles, data indicate that the economy-wide average wage tripled
from about 6,700 roubles per month in 2000 to over 19,000 in 2008 (Rosstat). Because
of the appreciation of the rouble, real income per capita in current US dollars
increased tenfold. GDP per capita narrowed to the upper half of the OECD. Total
GDP set off from a dismal 271 billion USD in 1998 to 2 trillion USD in 2012
(IMF). The benefits of growth trickled down to all parts of Russian society. This
performance shaped self-confidence of the population and legitimacy of the
elites.
A
more detailed narrative tells a controversial story about these impressive
figures. Ian Morris calls it the “paradox of development, “ and Mark Elvin the
“high-level equilibrium trap”: When a country thinks it is in a golden age, it
stops focusing on progress.
Russia
is still within a century-long wave-like development pattern of oscillation between
external-induced shock therapy and inward turning, leaving a legacy of
ambivalence towards modernity. The beginnings of the particular eras are
personalized with their rulers: Peter and Catharina the Great, Alexander II of
Russia and Lenin. The socialist revolution was nurtured from the gap between
West’s advancement and Russia’s limited industrialization within a huge
territory. A trade-off between the need of market and civil-society
institutions versus economic growth allowed super power status, an arms race
and an ideological confrontation with the rest of the world. After 70 years,
the modernization impulse was exhausted and the Soviet Union has imploded
beyond repair.
Yeltsin
started in 1991 a new cycle with a trial-and-error phase of ambitious market-oriented
and democratic reforms. The objective was to set up the missing institutions
and capacities, necessary to modernize the country and compete in global
markets. The societal cost of these demanding institutional innovations were
high: loss of national identify, demographic collapse, hardships of economic restructuring
and social misery. The Russian default of 1998 demonstrated the extent to which
the entire social edifice was overstretched by the challenges of modernity.
Putin’s
reign of 1999 started as a turning point towards consolidation within this
cycle. Unfortunately, relief came also
by a parallel global commodity boom. Due to the outstanding cost-benefit
profile, incentives favoured the integration of the inherited
resource-intensive economy into world markets. As a pathway to a dual economy,
any activity other than exporting commodities was not profitable or perceived
as not profitable. Russia developed some high-value activities outside the
country. London- named Londongrad by the oligarchs’ -became a centre for
serving Russia’s needs in IPOs, business dispute settling and financial
engineering with the value of transactions reaching 100 billion USD a year. It is
estimated that the oil and gas rent reached about 30 per cent of Russia’s GDP.
Many companies took debts abroad, larger than their market capitalization.
The governing elite, increasingly
consisting of former KGB and military with their particular worldviews,
exploited the results of the fortuitous set of circumstances and vindicated
blind eyes to corruption and increasing dependency on hydrocarbon extractions. Russia’s
economic modernization was limited to islands consisting of export pipelines,
retail and consumption, and stayed ossified und inefficient, with disappointing
investments in human capital and a deteriorating physical infrastructure.
With
the fast-economy growing fast, incentives for following on Jelzin’s risky and
demanding path of structural, institutional and social reforms were lost. After
“low hanging fruit” of basic economic reform and prudent macroeconomic policies
were picked up, the reform process slowed down in the face of popular
indifference, bureaucratic inertia, and political resistance and manoeuvring. Missing institutional
constrains similar to those in Australia or Norway, the Dutch disease and the
resource curse worked their way. After 2000 structural reforms stopped by and
large. While becoming richer, the country missed the chance to exploit
windfalls to move up the global value chain.
Growth
slowed down before the financial crisis of 2008 as an indication that Russia’s
business model exhausted itself again. (When this happened in the 1970-ies, the
Soviet Union started to export commodities, delaying change for many years.)
The leadership did what it could to encourage change without addressing the
underlying systemic problems of the post-Soviet state-let style of development.
The list of failed initiatives to generate momentum from Russia’s newly-won soft
and hard power is frustratingly long: the German-Russian partnership for
modernization in 2008, the use of state-owned Gasprom as an instrument of
foreign policy, the new-built town of Skolkovo as the Russian respond to the Silicon
Valley, the Eurasian Union as a challenger to European Union for global
influence (Beauchamp), the
Collective Security Treaty Organization as a counterweight to NATO, an attempt
to copy the US government that made huge investments in the development of
nanotechnology in the 1990s (Block and Keller, 2011), a state program to enter
the global aviation market, and other unsuccessful attempts to approach the
technological frontier besides defence and aerospace. Billions were spent, but the
declared results not achieved.
Sadly,
as a downside of a “managed democracy”, Russia does not have an institutional landscape
as in advanced Western democracies for a smooth replacement of the governing
elite. The protests in December 2012 by urban middle-class dweller were brought
under control, but proved the possibility of a regime change from the bottom. In
order to strengthen legitimacy, Russia’s “securocratic” regime moved to the
right and switched public attention beyond economic growth. In a kind of
delayed reaction to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and skilfully
exploiting the fragile national identity after the traumatic loss of superpower
status, Putin promoted the vision of neo-Soviet authoritarian empire. From now
on, the regime relied increasingly on nationalism, positioned Russia as a moral
superior defender of conservative values and, recently, started a populist
media campaign against Ukraine’s Euromaidan.
In
the wake of Crimea’s annexation, President Putin gained approval ratings of up
to 86 per cent (Bowen). At the same time, the economic results of Putin’s statecraft
went into the negative: “Putin’s seizure of
Crimea has weakened the Russian economy, led to China getting a bargain gas
deal, revived NATO, spurred Europe to start ending its addiction to Russian gas
and begun a debate across Europe about increasing defence spending”(Friedman).
Russia
follows its own logic of historic development. As many times before, the
country is on the eve of a new development cycle. The current national political
equilibrium in support of Putin’s time in power is not stable at all. We are on
the eve of the end of Putin’s era. A window of opportunities will open, where the
cooperation with the West for identifying new opportunities will be
appreciated. The success and deepness of these upcoming reforms will define Russia’s
development trajectory for a decade and more. Latest in five years, Russia will
be a very different country.
Ukraine
While
Poland and Russia started the transition process with almost a similar GDP per capita
as the Ukraine, they are now 2 and 3 times richer. Before the crisis, the outlook
of leading experts was positive. “Ukraine is a competitive authoritarian
regime, more pluralistic than those of Russia, Kazakhstan or Belarus” (Ishenko)
and Ukraine is “an oligarchy about to break down into a democracy” (Aslund
2007:279). Why is the Ukraine now then near the bottom of transition country
league tables, has the most energy inefficient economy, is riddled with
unprecedented corruption and state failure?
A
reason might be the consistently bad political decisions over the last two
decades (Ash). For supply-siders, the underlying rational is the failure to
push through reforms. Others maintain that Ukraine is located in the no-mans
land between two economic regions and fails to capitalize on size. Lacking valuable
natural resources, business opportunities and favourable bio-geography, Ukraine
might just have bad luck. We investigate in more detail the influence of two factors,
state building and the emergence of an adequate growth model, which might have
contributed to the current state of affairs.
The challenge of state and nation building:
The economist Alfred Marshall remarked in 1919: “The
state is the most precious of human possessions and no care can be too great to
be spent on enabling it to do its work in the best way.” As the rule of the
thumb, it counts for 50 per cent of difference in GDP per head (Diamond).
Ukraine has been independent for only 23 years with some historic roots before
the 14th century. Furthermore, the Ukrainian territory is
heterogeneous. The west of the Ukraine is largely Catholic, speaks Ukrainian, was
part of the Habsburg monarchy and has had a century-long strong orientation towards
the West. Economically it is dominated by agriculture with low productivity and
high unemployment. The East is largely Russian Orthodox. As an industrial
heartland of the former Soviet Union, it has outdated technology, depends on
subsidizes, but still has above average value creation and export activities. Its
foreign orientation is mainly towards Russia, following historic, cultural,
mental and economic links.
Periodic
turmoil and deep-seated fragmentation of the society might be an indicator that
the elites are challenged by the Westphalian sovereignty, granted in 1991, and
some elements of formal or juridical sovereignty are still significant
(Jackson). Considering the conflict-ridden European history in the Middle Ages and
the civil wars in the Balkan in the 1990-ies, Ukraine might be still perceived
as a country on its way from a sum of regions to a nation. The implications are
higher transaction costs and lower social capital. In a classic case of negative externalities, the localized costs of
suboptimal behaviour - the ones one might expect to be internalized - fall well
short of the overall national costs, contributing to elite capture and
corruption. Consequently,
spill over effects of tensions and loss of confidence contribute to lower
outcomes, and higher risks of change for the years to come.
Indeed,
we are beginning to understand nation building, including the identification of
triggers that results in entering a sustainable modernization path. During the
last decade, the international community has invested trillions of USD in Iraq
and Afghanistan, that is comparable with the total of official development assistance
since World War II and exceeds many time the GDP of the beneficiary countries. The
focus was often on democratic skills and institution, civic participation, and
good governance. The US alone invested US$ 5 billion (2,8 per cent of annual
GDP) in Ukraine (Neuland). Of
course, these are important wealth-enhancing arrangements, but their perception
as a precondition for economic growth is a recent phenomenon. Historically,
democratization often followed growth. In the US during its revolution, in Germany
after World War II and in South Korea during the 1980-ies, the political
consensus turned in favour of democratic and inclusive institutions because of
economic incentives, not vice versa. Contrary to common economic textbooks, China’s
successful reforms were the results of a bottom-up process of intensive institutional
trial and error on local and regional levels (Rodrik 2007: 92). The Singaporean
consensus, for example, promotes public housing, academic meritocracy, elite
governance and primacy of growth as one of many alternatives to the Washington
consensus that stills dominate international institutions. Little is understood
about what is correlation and what is causation.
Identifying a sustainable growth trajectory.
Every country has a growth model that embeds the
national economy in competitive global markets and positions it in the global value
creation pyramid. For more than 100 years the US is at the top as the “indispensable”
start-up nation, creating an asymmetric equilibrium with the rest of the world
(Acemoglu). With high costs, it defines by and large the global technological
frontier and innovates value chains, corporate business models and institutions
that diffuse to the rest of the world, either immediately, or throughout many decades.
Germany found a lucrative global niche in the middle-technology segment by combining
high-tech technologies with traditional metal. Competitive medium-sized
companies, the Hidden Champions of the Mittelstand, lead the manufacture sector. China captured on technological breakthroughs
in transport and communication, a massive capital inflow of $ 1 trillion in
foreign direct investment since 1992 and unimpeded access to Western consumer
markets. Its labour-intensive and export-led model redefined global division of
labour and made it the manufacturer of the world. On a lower scale, India became
the office of the world. The new EU accession states prospered due to their
integration into a single market as a provider of qualified, low-cost labour in
exchange to subsidies, direct investment, know-how and a stable institutional
landscape.
Identification
of an appropriate growth model for the Ukraine faces a most complicated mix of
challenges and opportunities. As a complexity analysis shows (Escobaria 2014), Ukraine
exports machines and equipment to Russia and low-value agriculture products (soybeans,
honey) and commodities (metal and steel) to the West. This is an unfavourable
situation because - all other things being equal - the amount of structural change
and investment is higher than in other countries.
Thus,
an increase in Ukraine’s export of agricultural products requires investments
investment and capacities for providing the regulatory, legal and other
frameworks. On the one hand, Ukraine’s natural conditions are above average as
the territory is mostly covered by fertile black dirt, has a favourable climate
and demand occurs from the nearby world’s largest economic region. But in a
classical hen and egg problem, the critical point is a long way away from providing
the required state capacities, the necessary smart public investment in market
creation and, eventually, a business environment that is enabling, stable,
predictable, free of corruption and attractive for national and foreign capital.
There
is no demand on Western markets for Ukraine’s machines and equipment. Foreign (Western)
investment might be hampered by the close link of the sector with Russia’s
defence industry.
Ukraine’s
Eastern industrial heartland, particularly the Donbass basin with its
old-fashioned energy-intensive coal and steel industry, needs investment, new
management and, particularly, energy-saving technology. The experience of the US
and EU in restructuring heavy industry and mining clusters does not give cause
for optimism. Wallonia, the first industrialized part of continental Europe, is
underperforming and might be forced into independence by the richer parts of
Belgium. Some towns in Germany’s Rhine basin are in worse shape than
socialist-ridden Eastern Germany. The US rust belt is still the synonym for
economic decline, population loss and decay. In all these cases, drivers of
growth switched and costs of restructuring exceeded new value creation. Consequently
and with mixed success, the focus moved on managing the transition to
knowledge-intensive activities, outsourcing, downsizing, “factoryless”
manufacturing and deindustrialization. As a result, not the West, but investment-led
and environmental-intensive China counts today nearly for half the world’s
steel and other low-value commodities. For
Ukraine, the search is out for an appropriate niche in the global market place
that stops the relative fall in its economic dynamic.
The
EU – Ukraine Association Agreement has offered a long-term development perspective,
but is not a short-term game changer. Ukraine might be in a situation like
Greece that lucks a sizable export potential and trade competitiveness. It is
therefore no surprise that austerity and structural reforms add to a painfully
slow process of harnessing the advantages from a single market. A similar
example provides Mexico. It achieved on average growth rates of less than 2 per
cent per capita after signing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
in 1994, which is low by emerging-economy standards. Mario Draghi, the ECB’s
president, raised the following concerns in regard to EU’s Southern periphery:
“Each economy has to stand on its own feet. It has to be productive and
competitive enough to benefit from the opportunities afforded by the Single
Market” (Draghi). Eventually, the EU will find a mechanism for dealing with its
periphery, an advantage that Ukraine does not have.
Summarizing
the situation, Ukraine will need time to recover from the current shocks. It is
faced with a dilemma of multiple crisis and the needs of demanding structural
reforms. Significant risks remain for institutional overstretch and
instability. Some indices of state failure do not disappear. The country has to
balance the inherent trade-off between short-term costs and long-term benefits.
On
a geopolitical and strategic level, the options of the West to frame these
efforts might be reduced to two options. One policy is the focus on stability and
macroeconomic stimulus (Gros, Summer, Gorodnichenko).
The decline of GDP of more than 7 per cent for this year should be offset by
financial and technical assistance of the broader international community. One
might remember that the containment doctrine during Cold War included strategic
support to frontline states like South Korea and Taiwan that triggered high
growth rates. History does not repeat, political and technological
circumstances are very different today. Ukraine competes with other
geopolitical problems for resources and political attention, such as the
aftermath of Arab spring, the emergence of the ISIS-state, a violent Bosnia,
the Middle East conflict, and more. Nevertheless, the amount and conditions of investment
test the political commitment of the West to support democratic change in
Ukraine.
The
other option, which is currently implemented, is support in exchange to a
reform package with focus on structural reforms, fiscal stabilization and
spending cuts. Ukraine will receive amounts up to $ 27 billion (15 per cent of
annual GDP) over the next two years that covers reported financial needs of the
government (Erlanger). The IMF
program intends to float the Ukraine currency, remove energy subsidises, raise
taxes and freeze minimum wages. At least in the short-term, this will contribute
to a substantial economic contraction and political instability.
In
our best guess, in five years a realistic scenario for Ukraine is a recovery
from the current crisis, a durable cooperation with Russia and the emergence of
the outlines fora sustainable growth model with a higher value proposition.
Recommendation and Conclusion
Based
on these considerations we reach some conclusion:
- De-escalate. Russia overplays its cards, but has the advantage of an asymmetric player. Low-scale confrontation prolongs Putin’s political life cycle; hard sanctions will hurt not only the Russian economy. The leitmotif should be the art of muddling through in order to achieve normalcy. Compromises are needed in the best traditions of realpolitik.
- Prepare for a window of opportunity in Russia. The implosion of the Soviet Union took the West by surprise and there was no experience in of moving from a planned economy to a market economy. Today the situation differs. It would be a mistake to take current events by face value and assume historic linearity.
- Stabilize the Ukrainian state. The political stalemate between the West and Russia is a contributing factor to the disorder in Ukraine. Russia cannot offer a long-term growth perspective; the West still copes with the aftermath of the global recession and looks inwards. Ukraine needs stability, time and resources for a trial-and-error process that encourages nation building and the identification of a suitable growth model.
Literature:
Acemoglu,
Daron; James A Robinson; Thierry Verdier: Can’t we all be more like
Scandinavians? Asymmetric growth and institutions in an interdependent world.
NBER Working paper No. 18441
Ash,
Timothy (2014). Ukraine sets course for Europe. Financial Times. June 27, 2014
Aslund,
Anders (2009). The Russian Economy: More than Just Energy. Testimony for the
Committee on Foreign Aiffairs of the European Parliament. April 2009. https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.iie.com%2Fpublications%2Fpapers%2Faslund0409.pdf
Aslund,
Anders (2014). “Russia is in no economic shape to fight a war. Op-ed in the Moscow Times. 22 April 2014.
Beauchamp,
Zack (2014). “Putin’s rebooted Soviet Union is weak and dommed”. Vox. May 30, 2014.
http://www.vox.com/2014/5/30/5762650/eurasian-union-eu-weak-sauce-gdp-military
Berman,
Ilan (2013). Implosion: The end of Russia and what it means for America. Regnery
Publishing. 2013.
Block,
F.L. and Keller, M.R. (eds.) (2011) State of innovation: The U.S. government’s
role in technology development. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers.
Bowen,
Andrew S. “Crimea will be Putin’s undoing.” The Moscow Times. July 8, 2014. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/crimea-will-be-putins-undoing/503162.html
Connolly,
Richard (2013). “State-industry Policy in Russia: The Nanotechnology Industry.”
Post-Soviet Affairs, 29:1, 1-30 : http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2013.778545
Darden,
Keith (2014). How to save Ukraine. Why Russia is not the real problem. Foreign
Affairs. April 14, 2014. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141182/keith-darden/how-to-save-ukraine
Diamond,
Jared What makes countries rich or poor ? The New York Review of Books. June 7,
2012 http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/jun/07/what-makes-countries-rich-or-poor/
Draghi,
Mario (2014). Memorial lecture in honour of Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. London,
July 9, 2014. http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2014/html/sp140709_2.en.html
Dworkin,
Anthony, Daniel Levy, Francois Godement, Kadri Liik, Mark Leonard, Pior Buras.
“Ten global consequences of the Ukraine crisis.”European Council of Foreign
Relation. June 15, 2014. http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_ten_global_consequences_of_ukraine272
Erlanger, Steven and David M. Herszenhorn (2014). “I.M.F. Prepares $18
Billion in Loans for Ukraine,” New York
Times, March 27, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/28/world/europe/ukraine-bailout.html
Friedman,
Thomas (2014). Putin Blinked. The New York Times. May 27, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/opinion/friedman-putin-blinked.html
Gaddy,
Clifford A.; Barry W. Ickes (2010). Russia after the global crisis. Eurasian
Geography and Economics, 2010, 51, No. 3, pp.281 – 311. Bellwether Publishing,
Ltd.
Ghosh,
Mridula. In Search of Sustainability. Civil Society in Ukraine. Study. Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung. June 2014. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/10862.pdf
Gorodnichenko,
Yuriy. Macroeconomic stimulus for Ukraine. www.voxukraine.blogspot.de. July 24,
2014.
Granville,
Johanna (2014). The Folly of Playing High-Stake Pokers with Putin: More to lose
than gain over Ukraine. http://jackmatlock.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/High-Stakes-Poker-with-Putin-sg.pdf
Gros,
Daniel (2014). “Restarting Ukraine’s Economy”. Project Syndicate. April 3, 2014
IMF
(International Monetary Fund), “Gross Domestic Product, Current Prices U.S.
Dollars,” in World Economic Outlook
Database, June 2014 [www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/
weodata/index.aspx], last accessed March 25, 2010.
Ishchenko,
Volodymyr. Ukraine Fractures. Interview. New Left review 87, May June 2014. http://newleftreview.org/II/87/volodymyr-ishchenko-ukraine-s-fractures
King, Charles (2014). Troubling Secessionist Models
for Ukraine. Council for Foreign Relations. June 6, 2014. http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/troubling-secessionist-models-ukraine/p33071
Kissinger,
Henry A. “To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end.” The Washington Post.
March 5, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html
Luhn,
Alec (2014). “Will the IMF Bailout Turn Ukraine Into Another Greece?” The
Nation, April 7, 2014. http://www.thenation.com/article/179212/will-imf-bailout-turn-ukraine-another-greece
McInerney,
Luke. China and the rise of the West.
https://www.academia.edu/2419953/China_and_the_rise_of_the_West
Morris,
Ian (2010). Why the West rules – for now. Profile Books. 2010.
Nuland,
Victoria (2013). “Remarks at the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation Conference,”
Washington, DC, December 13, 2013, U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2013/dec/218804.htm
Posner, Eric A. (2014). “Sorry, America, The New World Order
is Dead.” Foreign Policy. May 6, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/06/sorry_america_the_new_world_order_is_dead_russia_ukraine
Rodrik,
Dani. One Economics, Many Recipes. Globalization, Institutions and economic
Growth. Princeton University Press.2007
Summers,
Lawrence. “Potemkin money” is the wrong way to help Ukraine. FT March 9, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/31f401e6-a53f-11e3-8988-00144feab7de.html#axzz38VBYOsfD
Rosstat
data (http://www.gks.ru )
Gaddy,
Clifford A.; Barry W. Ickes (2010). Russia after the global crisis. Eurasian
Geography and Economics, 2010, 51, No. 3, pp.281 – 311. Bellwether Publishing
Ltd.
No comments:
Post a Comment