IMF’s program in Ukraine: How to create a new Greece
By Yuriy
Gorodnichenko (UC Berkeley)
More information
came in about the deal between the IMF and the new government in Ukraine. While
some conditions (e.g., switch hryvnya (Ukraine’s
currency) to a floating exchange rate regime and depreciate to correct external
imbalances) appear reasonable, others appear to be surprising given the experience
of the Great Recession.
Specifically, the fiscal position of the government in Ukraine is weak with a deficit of
5 to 9 percent of GDP—the exact magnitude depends on how one treats “off-balance
sheet” liabilities (e.g. state owned enterprises). Clearly, a fiscal
consolidation is needed. The IMF demanded
that the government raise taxes (about 2 percent of GDP), cut spending (about 3
percent of GDP), remove energy subsidies to population (1 percent of GDP), and freeze
minimum wages. The government agreed to raise energy prices charged by
utilities by 50 percent starting May 1, 2014. The program envisions a
gradual expenditure-led fiscal adjustment—proceeding at a pace commensurate
with the speed of economic recovery and protecting the vulnerable—aiming to
reduce the fiscal deficit to around 2½ percent of GDP by 2016. In short, the
IMF wants Ukraine to implement a massive, front-loaded fiscal contraction.
This is a bad idea. First, many commentators
observed a strong negative correlation between fiscal consolidation and GDP
growth in Eurozone countries during the Great Recession (see Figure 1). While
the IMF demonstrated more flexibility with respect to fiscal reforms in these
countries, it was still far too aggressive on forcing countries to keep
balanced budgets. PIGS
countries had to implement large fiscal consolidation, they had deep
recessions, and even now they have weak economic growth.
Figure 1: Austerity in the Euro area; source: Paul Krugman’s blog. |
Second, recent research has converged on the consensus that fiscal
multipliers may be particularly large during recessions ([1],
[2])
and financial crises ([3]) so that
fiscal consolidations could be particularly painful when economies are weak. Even
IMF economists acknowledge
that fiscal multipliers could be larger than the IMF thought. That is, the IMF
consistently underestimated the negative effects of fiscal contraction during
the Great Recession (see Figure 2). Olivier Blanchard,
the chief economist of the IMF, argues that
the timing for fiscal consolidation should be “less now, more later.” In other
words, fiscal consolidation should be done when economies are doing well rather
than when they are depressed.
Figure 2. Growth Forecast Errors vs. Fiscal Consolidation Forecasts in Europe. Figure plots forecast error for real GDP growth in 2010 and 2011 relative to forecasts made in the spring of 2010 on forecasts of fiscal consolidation for 2010 and 2011 made in spring of year 2010; and regression line. Source. |
One may argue that fiscal consolidations should be
front-loaded because i) a crisis may be the only time when politicians can do
reforms, ii) a fiscal consolidation may restore confidence and resume economic growth,
iii) fiscal consolidation could be the only feasible option to balance the budget. While these could
be good arguments, I believe that none of them applies to Ukraine: i) Ukraine
is going to implement wide-ranging reform as a part of its association
agreement with the EU anyway; ii) given a very low income per capita, Ukraine is
likely to grow fast in the medium run (fighting corruption is by far more
important in restoring confidence); iii) many countries committed to loan vast
resources to Ukraine and so it can weather short-run difficulties.
In summary, fiscal consolidations
in weak economic conditions could be a kiss of death. One could have expected
that the IMF is going to learn from its mistakes but the program between the
IMF and Ukraine suggests otherwise. At this rate, the IMF can turn Ukraine into
Greece, a country with deep and prolonged economic contraction and continued
political instability. Is this what the IMF wants to achieve?
First off, thank you so much for this blog, I don't know how I didn't find it earlier. As an Ukrainian abroad it has been a struggle to explain everyday what Ukraine is like. Also the economics of the crisis need much more coverage. Дякую, пане!
ReplyDeleteThis is very concerning. Will however the devaluation at least partially offset the austerity via an export increase? How do the capital controls imposed by the previous government fit in the picture?
The devaluation is already huge and will probably continue, it isn't matched by any of the countries in the sample. I would love it if you can comment on the exchange rate.