Local Government Reform: Corruption and Accountability
By Donna Kim and Yuriy Gorodnichenko (UC
Berkeley)
Robert Hawkins once said that corruption
has been with us since the beginning of human organization but one cannot be complacent
about corruption because it eats not only at the economic fabric of society but
also at the moral foundations. It is hard to imagine that corruption is going
to be eradicated completely but there is a simple set of rules that can
minimize corruption. “Corrupt
cities” is a wonderful cookbook of such rules. The guiding principle is that
one can identify areas where corruption can arise and then prevent it.
Specifically, the
book offers a simple formula: corruption = monopoly power + discretion of
officials minus accountability. In other words, corruption is strong where an
official has exclusive power to deliver a service (e.g. issue a permit), where
he or she has freedom in interpreting facts and rules (e.g., there is no framework
or formula for making consistent decisions), where he or she does not report to anybody and
his/her activity is not subject to the public’s scrutiny (e.g., all
documentation is for “internal use only”). “Corrupt
cities” presents many examples of how one can break corruption by a
combination of simple policies that reduce monopoly power (e.g., use
procurement or vouchers to obtain services) and discretion (e.g., minimize
stages of decision making and simplify rules) and increase accountability
(e.g., make hearings on key decisions public, publish reports about tenders,
and use e-governance).
Using past
experience of minimizing corruption at the local level is key for the design
and implementation of the decentralization reform in Ukraine. Indeed,
opposition to decentralization often points out the potential risks of
corruption and accountability issues at the local government level where it
could be easier to capture government. Obviously, this is not a problem
specific to Ukraine. The key question is how to minimize possibilities for such
adverse effects and this is where the formula above is very helpful. In this
post, we review two policies implemented in Poland with the goal to raise
accountability and transparency of local governments.
Poland certainly
experienced cases of corruption during the decentralization process, especially
in the realm of municipal property management and local positions of authority.
The Polish government responded to such cases by making various legislative
amendments and creating new institutions. For instance, the 1994 Law on Public
Procurement addressed the problem of local positions of authority being offered
to individuals based on their party affiliation and contracts concluded with
friendly terms by obliging local governments to follow public procurement
procedures. The 1995 changes to the Local Government Act enacted so-called
anti-corruption regulations to address common cases of executive boards
employing gmina councilors and thereby subjecting them to dependence on the
executive bodies. The rest of this post will elaborate on the two notable
institutions established by the 1990 Local Government Act: the Appellate
Committee and the Regional Audit Chambers.
The Appellate Committee
The Appellate Committees are independent
entities operating at voivodship levels, funded by the state budget. By
allowing decisions relating to gminas’ inherent and delegated responsibilities
to be appealed to such independent committees, the citizens’ right to make
appeals was ensured while limiting the central administrative authority.
Only legal
provisions guide members of appellate committees. This regulation guarantees
that they are independent in their rulings on administrative matters and
eliminates interference from other authorities. The principle of collective
decision-making applies, while the principle of equal parties used in appellate
committees differs from ordinary administrative proceedings in which
administrative authorities occupy a privileged position.
With
signs of irregularities in the work of a gmina authority, the chairperson of
the local appellate committee may make the so-called “signal” decision that
provides the basis for starting disciplinary proceedings against local
government officials. The committees also have the option of submitting legal
queries to the Supreme Court of Administration and Constitutional Tribunal, an
important measure in standardizing rulings on matters addressed. Most of the
questions have concerned with financial law, liquor licenses, land use, local
taxes and fees. Refer to Table 1 for more details.
Table 1.
Subject
|
number of
cases
|
%
|
Land
Use
|
11,335
|
15.6
|
Public
Welfare
|
10,852
|
14.9
|
Local
Taxes & Fees
|
21,475
|
29.6
|
Housing
Regulations
|
5,153
|
7.1
|
Environmental
Protection
|
1,604
|
2.2
|
Liquor
License
|
4,821
|
6.6
|
Real
Estate Mgmt.
|
3,698
|
5.1
|
Perpetual
Usufruct Fees
|
11,687
|
16.1
|
Other
|
1,969
|
2.7
|
Total
|
72,594
|
100.0
|
Source: Regulski, J. (2003). Local government reform in Poland: an insider's story.
Regional Audit Chambers
Regional Audit Chambers (RIOs), composed
of representatives from the government, the ministry of finance and
associations of local governments, is another institution created during the
local government reform in Poland. There are 16 of them, one in each
voivodship, and the National Council of Regional Chambers of Audit (the KRRIO)
coordinates the work of all the chambers and represents them before other state
entities. As of 2001, the Minister of Interior and Administration supervises
RIOs in what concerns the compliance of their operation with law.
RIOs were
established primarily to combat the central interference problem such as the
central administration meddling in gminas’ finances. They supervise the financial
matters of local authorities and audit financial management and public
procurement for the following local bodies: 1) local government units (gminas,
powiats, voivodships) 2) local government unions and associations 3)
local government organizational subsidiary units, including legal entities and
4) other bodies' use of subsidies received from local government budgets.
Comprehensive audits are performed at least every four years, but unscheduled
or problem-focused audits can be carried out any time if necessary or upon
proposal of the local authorities. The audit chambers are only able to evaluate
expenditures in terms of their consistency with the law and documents of the
actual state of affairs.
Based
on the audit findings, the inspectors draw up a post-audit report, which
includes information on detected irregularities, persons responsible and
recommendations or solutions. The report is sent to the audited local
government, who must reply within 30 days informing the chamber of the measures
adopted in response to the report or the failure to do so with stated reasons.
The board of the RIO, whose decision is final and binding, considers such
objections by the audited local government.
RIOs
may also perform opinion-giving functions on matters such as paying back
credits or loans, financing the budget deficit and public debt forecast, etc.
In summary, the key question is not
whether decentralization is going to increase corruption but whether the reform
is going to establish institutions to control corruption effectively. Ukraine can emulate best practice from other countries and the Polish experience can be a useful starting point.
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